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ABSTRACT:
With distinct Chinese characteristics, the petition system in China has
played several important roles in the reflection of public opinion, social
supervision of state organizations and personnel, dispute settlement between citizens and the government, and the unification of Chinese people.
Since this system faces many challenges going forward, its reform is an
important task for the political authorities in China. This article analyzes
the design defects of the petition system from both macro and micro perspectives and the consequences resulting from such defects; it then advances suggestions regarding potential reforms.
INTRODUCTION
The petition is also called “Xinfang” or “letters and visits.” It is one of
the most important ways for the Chinese government to settle social conflict
and to keep society stable. The petition system is a mechanism with distinct
Chinese characteristics and has developed gradually alongside economic
and social development in China. To regulate the activities and the procedure of the petition, the Chinese State Council promulgated “Regulations on
Letters and Visits of the P.R.C.” (hereinafter referred to as “Regulations on
Letters and Visits” or “RLV”) in 1995 and in 2005.1 In addition, the new
regulation “Opinions regarding further strengthening of the work related to
letters and visits in the new period” (hereinafter referred to as “Opinions
Regarding Letters and Visits” or “OLV”) was formulated by the Central
This research is supported by the Jiu San Society (September 3rd) Shanghai Committee.
* Prof. Dr. Xujun Gao holds the chair of ThyssenKrupp Economic Private Law of ChineseGerman Postgraduate School of Tongji University Shanghai. He is also the managing director of
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1. “Regulations on Letters and Visits of the P.R.C.” was first promulgated by the State
Council in 1995 and was amended in 2005.
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Committee of China Communist Party (hereinafter referred to as “CCP”)
and the State Council in 2007. In the past, the petition system played an
important role in strengthening social supervision and resolving disputes
and conflicts. However, it now faces challenges to its existence and further
development for several reasons.
From the perspective of citizens on the one hand, petition is not only a
legal right granted by the law but also a method of legal remedy that is
explicitly stated in the law. In fact, the huge number of annual petitions
indicates that the Chinese people especially trust this system. Indeed, they
prefer the petition to the normal judicial remedy procedure, so much so that
there is a popular saying in China: “trust petition rather than the law, trust
the central [government] rather than the local [government], trust [causing]
trouble rather than [being] rational.”2 Thus, this phenomenon has seriously
damaged the authority of the state judicial organizations as well as the laws.
From the perspective of the government, however, the petition is
viewed skeptically. This is evidenced by the fact that the government has
obstructed the use of the petition system. In terms of direct obstacles, the
subordinate governments send their people to Beijing and the provincial
capital cities to prevent petitioners from appealing to the higher government
or state authorities by means of “intercepting and abducting petitioners”
(see Part I, E infra) and then imposing compulsory punishment measures,3
such as imprisonment and detainment, upon petitioners. There are also indirect obstacles, one example being that the government at all levels in China
regularly drafts and publishes a “ranking-list of petition disposition” (see
Part I, C infra) and adopts it as a major criterion of the appraisal system of
the subordinate governments as well as their officials. If a responsible government falls behind others in the ranking-list, it reflects poor performance
on the part of that government and the corresponding chief official.4
Both direct and indirect obstacles restrict Chinese citizens from exercising their legal rights. The concern and restrictions from the government
suggest that there are significant defects in the existing petition system.
Therefore, its reform has become an important issue this year for the authorities and legislature in China.5 This article analyzes the existing design
2. Hu Jianmiao (
),
[Where Is the Way Out of Petition
[STUDY TIMES], May 27, 2013, at 5.
System Reform],
),
[Critics on the Chinese Petition System],
3. Yu Jianrong (
[CHINA REFORM], Feb. 2005, at 26, 28.
),
4. Id. at 26, 27; Peng Mei (
[Petition Ranking Is Suspended for Months, Still No Idea if it Will Be Cancelled Permanently],
NANJING DAILY, May 8, 2013, http://www.njdaily.cn/2013/0508/400061.shtml.
5. Cui Qingxin (
) & Liu Yizhan (
),
[China Will Carry Forward the System Reform of Household Register and Re-education Through
Labor], XINHUA NET (Jan. 7, 2013, 8:33 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-01/07/c_
114284800.htm.
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defects of the petition system in China, as well as their results, and puts
forth some suggestions for its reform.
I. CONCEPTS

OF THE

CHINESE PETITION SYSTEM

Before entering into an analysis of the systemic defects of the Chinese
petition system, it is necessary to explain the meaning of several important
concepts.
A. Petition and the Petition System in China
Petition (“Xinfang” in Chinese) is the abbreviation of “letters and visits” in the Chinese language. According to Art. 2 of the RLV, the term
“letters and visits” means that citizens, legal persons, or other organizations
give information, make comments or suggestions, or lodge complaints to
the relevant departments of Chinese governments. The “letters and visits”
(e-mails, faxes, phone calls, in-person visits, and so on) are sent to the government at the county level or above and are dealt with by the relevant
administrative departments.
According to this definition, the petition system is an administrative
system in which state authorities at all levels set up a special department
with a dedicated staff to deal with the letters, visits, and calls from the
people. The system is based on the principles that “each level of government shall assume responsibility for its own work” and “the matter of a
petitioner should be dealt with by the corresponding authority, which has
the necessary competence.” The petition system includes not only the regulation mechanism defined in the RLV and the OLV, but also the concrete
measures adopted by the governments at all levels in the petition practice
(e.g. “ranking-list of petition disposition” and “responsibility system of
chief officials”).
According to the initial plan of the Chinese legislature, the Chinese
petition system was to have three functions. The first function was to gather
information from the people. The government could obtain first-hand
knowledge of the problems confronting ordinary citizens and adopt proper
measures by using the petition system. The second function was to allow
citizen participation in the deliberation and administration of public affairs.
Chinese citizens are entitled to give their suggestions on urban planning,
environmental protection, legislation, and so on, through the petition system. The third function lies in supervision over the government and its officials. In this sense, the petition system would also be a channel for reporting
corruption and violations of law by officials. However, the petition system’s most important function over the past several decades has been dispute resolution and claim settlement. In case there is a conflict between
citizens and government (or a third party), citizens are able to present their
problems through the petition system if they think their interests are at
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stake. The aim is to have higher government intervene in the procedure,
solve the problem, and settle the claims.
B. Petition Procedure
A normal petition case shall be disposed in accordance with the following procedure. The first step involves presenting petition applications.
According to the RLV, petition applications shall be presented in writing to
the petition department of government, the People’s Congress and its standing committee, the People’s Court, or the People’s Procuratorate Office in
accordance with their powers and functions. If petition applications are
presented by a visit, petitioners shall present them to the government directly in charge, or to the next highest level of government.
The second step involves the acceptance of petition applications. The
petition department shall review whether the presented petition applications
are within its authority and, if so, it shall accept the petition applications
and forward them to the competent authority, or the next lowest authority,
for further handling. The petition department itself does not have any substantial power to handle petition applications independently, but it can
transfer petition matters to other authorities and make suggestions on how
to proceed.
The third step involves processing petitions. The competent government authorities will determine the facts of the petition and whether its
request is lawful. They then support or deny the petitioner’s claim and answer in written form after completing their investigation.
C. Petition Ranking System
“Petition ranking,” also known as “ranking of abnormal petitions,” is a
monthly ranking published by the state petition office based on the total
number of cases of so-called “abnormal petitions” from each province.6
Governments at all levels have a similar ranking system. “Abnormal petition” means the petitioner has not presented the application to the corresponding department in charge according to the regulations, but has gone
directly to the province’s capital city or to the central government in Beijing. Unlawful activities and collective petitions also fall under the umbrella
of “abnormal petitions.” The legal basis of this ranking is Art. 7 of the
RLV. According to Art. 7, the government should use the ranking as an
important indicator to assess the performance of the government and its
public servants. All petition authorities circulate a ranking of the “abnormal
petitions” of their subordinate governments. The more petition cases raised,
6. The State Petition Office has suspended petition ranking since March 2013. However, the
[Cancel
petition ranking system is not officially abolished. See
the Petition and Let It Follow the Rule of Law], XINHUA NET (Nov. 13, 2013, 4:49 PM), http://
news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2013-11/13/c_125698195.htm.
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the worse the government’s ranking. This petition ranking system becomes
a main criterion for the appraisal and promotion of the chief officials.
D. A Responsibility System for Officials
Beyond the petition ranking system, a responsibility system for officials in charge of petition-related work has been established at both the
central and local levels of government. If petitions take place on a large
scale, or if petitioners raise continuous petitions collectively at the provincial government level or in Beijing, the official in charge of the subordinate
government (where the petitioners come from) assumes administrative responsibility and will be penalized according to the seriousness of the situation.7 As regulated in Art. 7 of the RLV, the individuals responsible for
malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed in petition-related work shall
be investigated and held responsible for such events.
E. Petition Interception and Abduction
“Petition interception” means that some local petition authorities and
personnel intercept petitioners and prevent them from raising a petition at
higher authorities. So-called “petition abduction” entails using violence to
restrict the freedom of the petitioners and to prevent them from raising their
petition. Examples of this include “compulsory mental health treatment”
and “re-education through labor.” The former involves local petition authorities and personnel forcing petitioners to stay in psychiatric hospitals
and accept compulsory mental health treatment. The latter is an ancient administrative penalty that is usually abused by local government to restrict
the freedom of petitioners.8 All of the compulsory measures have seriously
infringed on the personal and democratic rights of Chinese citizens and are
therefore illegal. Such measures are strongly criticized in China and have
become a major impetus toward the reform of the Chinese petition system.
II. DESIGN DEFECTS IN THE CHINESE PETITION SYSTEM
THEIR CONSEQUENCES

AND

The design defects of the Chinese petition system can be discussed
from both the macro and micro perspective. The “macro defects” relate to
the competition between the petition system and the normal judicial remedy
system. The petition system can replace the function of dispute resolution
otherwise reserved to the judicial remedy procedure. “Micro defects” are
7. Yu Jianrong (
),
[The Difficult Situation and the
[STRATEGY & MANAGEMENT], Jan. 2009, at
Way Out of the Chinese Petition System],
29.
8. “Re-education through labor” is an ancient administrative penalty in the form of restriction of freedom which can be executed without court decision in a certain period, normally one to
three years.
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those concrete problems that exist in the petition system. The following will
focus on the analysis of the design defects of the petition system and their
consequences from macro and micro perspectives.
A. Macro Design Defects and Their Consequences
According to Buddhist philosophy, everything that happens in the
world—including the development of civilization and the accumulation of
knowledge—has a cause and an effect.9 This theory of causation also applies to social phenomena that arise under certain conditions. In this sense,
we are convinced that there is also a close causal relationship between the
design defects of the petition system and the abnormal situation in petition
practice, namely “trust petition rather than the law, trust central [government] rather than local [government], trust [causing] trouble rather than [being] rational.”
1. Macro Design Defects of the Chinese Petition System
The main defect in the design of the Chinese petition system is that it
has a dispute resolution function. This function makes the petition system
an alternative to the traditional judicial remedy procedure. In theory, the
inherent character of the petition system provides the possibility of replacing the normal judicial remedy procedure. And in practice, the non-legal
factors existing in Chinese society can, to some extent, make this theory
into a reality.
a. The Shared Function of Dispute Resolution
First, the petition system has the same dispute resolution function as
the normal judicial remedy procedure. Art. 14 and Art. 15 of the RLV have
clearly distinguished the difference between “litigation-related petitions”
and “non-litigation-related petitions.” Petitioners are required expressly to
solve disputes through the judicial remedy procedure. However, many petitioners disregard this stipulation and insist on solving disputes through the
petition system instead of using normal judicial procedure. Even if such
disputes are already in the normal judicial process, many people still take
their claims to the petition department.10 These claims are usually legal in
nature, even though they are raised in a non-litigation-related petition. According to an empirical study, the main issues concerning “non-litigationrelated petitions” are unfair treatment of employees in the enterprise
9. Qiao Gensuo (
),
Research on the Karma Theory Between Tibetan and Chinese Buddhism],
TIBETOLOGY], Apr. 2011, at 44.
),
10. Wu Feng (
Litigation Related Petition—From Perspective of Conclusion Mechanism],
HAI ENTERPRISES], Oct. 2011, at 82, 83.

[Comparative
[CHINA
[Legal Control on
[SHANG-
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restructure process, as well as labor and social security issues; unfair treatment of farmers in land contracting, expropriation and requisition; economic compensation for urban residents in demolition cases; public
reporting of corruption; and the reporting of environmental pollution.11
However, all of these issues are essentially legal issues.
For instance, if an employee loses employment or retires early due to a
restructuring of the enterprise, the central point of the dispute concerns reemployment or economic compensation. Disputes arising from a land-contracting agreement are concerned with, in most instances, the
implementation and amendment of the agreement along with economic
compensation. Disputes regarding land expropriation in rural areas and
building demolition in urban areas focus on the resettlement cost or economic compensation, as well as fulfillment of the resettlement conditions.
All of these disputes are legal disputes, and they can be resolved through
the normal judicial procedure. Public reporting of corruption and bribery
are also legal issues regulated by the criminal law. Nevertheless, academic
and practical circles12 in China are of the opinion that they should all fall
under the jurisdiction of the petition authority. In fact, the responsible state
petition authorities always accept such claims. Art. 21 to Art. 36 in the RLV
set the procedure of acceptance and disposition of the petition application
and oblige the responsible authority to address the claims.
Thus in both theory and practice, the petition system has become a
separate dispute resolution system parallel to the normal judicial remedy
procedure. The basic aim is to settle disputes and obtain appropriate remedies by using the administrative process.13 As a result, Chinese citizens can
use the petition system, the judicial system, or both after they suffer an
injury.
b. Petition System Advantages Over Judicial Remedy
Procedure
Second, the petition system has evident advantages compared with the
normal judicial remedy procedure due to its unique character. As a method
of dispute resolution, the Chinese petition system allows petitioners to bring
their problems to the attention of the responsible petition authority. The
problem will be reviewed and decided by a joint board consisting of all
related authorities under the organization of the petition organ, so the interests of the petitioners are safeguarded. The petition system designed by the
Chinese legislature has specific advantages when compared with the normal
judicial remedy procedure.
11. Chen Jiqing (
),
the Chinese Petition System and the Improvement Measures],
TRATIVE MANAGEMENT], June 2006, at 17, 18.
), supra note 2.
12. Jianmiao (
), supra note 3, at 26, 27.
13. Jianrong (

[Existing Problems in
[CHINA ADMINIS-
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First, the petition procedure is relatively simple. There is no byzantine
legal text and complex court procedure; petitioners only need to report
problems and make their requests to certain governmental departments.
Second, the cost of a petition is low. Participants in the normal judicial
remedy procedure need to bear heavy costs, including attorney fees and
court costs; however, they do not need to pay such costs for petitions.
Third, the petition system may work more efficiently than the judicial procedure. The normal judicial procedure is regulated by the law, and it moves
very slowly. Even if someone wins their case, the enforcement of the judgment can still be complex and time consuming. In contrast, the petition
system works relatively efficiently. Especially in the case of an “overstepping petition,” the petitioners may have a positive response, and their
claims can be settled quickly. Finally, the results of the petition procedure
sometimes exceed petitioners’ expectations. In the normal judicial procedure, the court will make a decision strictly according to the law and there
is no space for negotiation. But local governments often make large concessions and provide various benefits to petitioners as consideration for giving
up the petition at a higher government level. This is because there is great
pressure to maintain social stability from higher levels of government, and
local authorities seek to avoid being punished because of overstepping
petitions.
These characteristics provide the petition system incomparable advantages that the normal judicial procedure does not possess. That is why many
people prefer the petition system rather than the normal judicial procedure.
c. Influence of Other Non-legal Factors on the Selection
Decision
Third, in addition to the inherent advantages of the petition system,
other non-legal factors also play an important role in whether to settle disputes through petition. One major factor is the problem of corruption in
Chinese judicial practice. Bad practices already prevalent in other areas of
public life—back-door deals, internal approvals via personal relationships,
etc.—have expanded to the judicial field. Sometimes it can be very difficult
to initiate a court procedure and enforcement without a personal relationship. According to a survey of 632 farmer-petitioners who came to Beijing
for petition at central government departments, 401 of them (63.4%) tried to
initiate a lawsuit before starting the petition procedure. Among them, 172
(42.9%) were refused by the court; 220 of them (54.9%) lost and believed
that the court did not try their case fairly; and 9 of them (2.2%) won but
believed that the judgment was not being enforced.14 This data may not be
absolutely objective, but it still reflects the perceived level of corruption in
14. Id.
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Chinese judicial practice and demonstrates the reasons Chinese citizens rely
on the petition system to solve their problems.
The second factor is the traditional Chinese belief of “longing for honest and upright officials.” Most petitioners believe that officials at higher
levels, especially at central authorities, are honest, upright, and just. For this
reason, many Chinese petitioners hope to submit their complaints directly to
the central authorities in order to pressure local governments to “find a final
solution” at last.15 This is also one reason, from the social perspective, why
Chinese citizens prefer the petition system to the judicial remedy procedure.
In summary, the Chinese legislature made the petition system capable
of dispute resolution, a function previously reserved to the normal judicial
remedy procedure. Moreover, the legislature made it more desirable than
the judicial route. In addition, non-legal factors also exert a great deal of
influence on the selection of the dispute resolution method. Thus, many
Chinese people prefer to use the petition system to solve their problems.
2. Consequences of Macro Design Defects
As mentioned above, there are design defects in the petition system.
These defects inevitably result in Chinese citizens preferring to settle their
disputes through the petition system. This is supported by the large number
of petition cases in recent years in China.
The present Chinese petition system led to an abnormal social phenomenon described in the popular sayings “Trust petition rather than the
law, trust central [government] rather than local [government], trust [causing] trouble rather than [being] rational” and “A problem will be thoroughly
resolved if someone causes a lot of trouble. A problem will be partly resolved if someone causes a little trouble. A problem will not be resolved if
one causes no trouble.”16 The fact that many citizens have refused the judicial remedy procedure and chosen the petition system is proof that the Chinese people trust petition more than the law, and trust the central
government more than local government. The petition practice in China
also indicates that the more trouble people make, the more attention they
get from the petition authority and the government, and the sooner the problem will be solved. The attitude and performance of the government in
China has led to this abnormal social phenomenon.
To be clear, the Chinese petition system has functions other than dispute resolution. Some examples include gathering information from the
people and encouraging people to participate in the deliberation and admin-

15. Id. at 27, 28.
16. Jianmiao (

), supra note 2.
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istration of state affairs.17 Had the Chinese legislature restricted the petition
system to these two functions at the time of its design, there would not be
so many people seeking to solve their problems via petitions. The abovementioned abnormal social phenomenon should not exist either. In fact, the
Chinese government has paid great attention to the matters of letters and
visits. In the early 1950s, the general office of CPC established a secretary
office to handle people’s letters to Mao and other state leaders. However, its
main functions at that time focused on getting information from people,
strengthening relations with the people, and fighting against bureaucracy.
Dispute resolution and safeguarding the interests of petitioners were not
included. Hence, concepts such as “petition,” “overstepping petition,” or
“trouble-making petition” did not exist at all at that time.18
B. Micro Design Defects and Their Consequences
1. Micro Design Defects of the Chinese Petition System
The Chinese petition system also suffers from micro design defects.
The following micro design defects could be the main reason why governments and officials in China restrict or even forbid citizens to raise petitions, especially overstepping petitions. The following sections discuss
specific micro defects in the design of the Chinese petition system.
a. Lack of Petition Authority Power, Poor Communication,
and Poor Coordination Among Petition Authorities
According to Art. 6 of the RLV, any people’s government at or above
the county level shall set up a department for letters and visits. The relevant
department of the people’s government at or above the county level and the
people’s government of the town or township shall, according to the principles of facilitating work and creating convenience for letter-writers and visitors, assign a unit or individuals responsible for the work regarding letters
and visits (hereinafter referred to as “the unit or the person for letters and
visits”). In accordance with this regulation, all the central and local public
organs such as the CCP committee, People’s Congress, and People’s Court
and Procuratorate Office, have a department in charge of issues relating to
petition. But in practice, the petition authorities of government at all levels
receive and handle the most petition cases. However, many defects exist
with regard to the working system of the petition authorities.
First, the petition authorities in China have very limited power. Although the petition authorities at different government levels are responsible for receiving, accepting, and handling petitions, the RLV does not grant
17. Chao (
),
System Since Sixty Years in the People’s Republic],
PARTY HISTORY RESEARCH], Nov. 2009, at 46, 47.
18. Id. at 46.

[Historic Research on the Petition
[THE CHINA COMMUNIST

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\12-1\UST102.txt

44

unknown

Seq: 11

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

8-JAN-16

12:11

[Vol. 12:1

petitioners any resources or power to solve problems. According to Art. 21
of the RLV, the petition departments have three powers and functions. The
first is the power of acceptance, which includes accepting and registering
the petition applications. The second is the power of forwarding. This includes forwarding the related petition applications to the responsible People’s Court, the Procuratorate Office, the People’s Congress and its
standing committee, or the governmental department in charge at the same
or lower administrative level, along with a duplicate to the petition authority of the next lowest government level. The third power is the power of
advice. Under this power, the petition organ shall make timely suggestions,
submitting such matters to the people’s government at the same level for
decision in case of any important or urgent matters.
It appears that the legal status of petition authorities at all levels is
relatively low and that they do not have any power to solve practical
problems. However, their responsibilities are quite important: petition cases
concern not only the abuse of power and corruption but also the “unfair
treatment” of employees in enterprises’ restructuring processes and labor
and social insurance issues.19 The legislature in China did not grant petition
authorities any real power to solve such problems, but it made petition authorities assume the primary burden of the petition work. This highlights
another design defect of the Chinese petition system: the power does not
match the responsibilities.20 As a result of this defect and insufficient work
personnel, petition authorities can do nothing but forward petitions to the
competent authorities.
Second, petition authorities are scattered in a mass of administrative
units with no harmonized coordination between them. As mentioned above,
the CCP committee, People’s Congress, government, People’s Court,
Procuratorate Office, and other related authorities at all levels have established their own petition offices. However, a subordinate relationship
among them does not exist. Even the national petition office has only a
limited power of coordination over the local petition authorities, and its
opinions have no binding effect on them either. Thus, the entire petition
system lacks a harmonized coordination mechanism. As a result, petitioners
can get different replies from different petition authorities for the same
problem—or petitioners get no help but keep running back and forth among
the petition authorities as each passes its responsibility on to another. According to the survey of 632 farmer-petitioners, the average number of visits to petition authorities is more than six. The petitioner with the most
visits had interacted with eighteen different petition organs.21

19. Jiqing (
20. Id.
21. Jianrong (

), supra note 11.
), supra note 3, at 26, 27.
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Since petition organs do not have real power to resolve petitions and
can only forward the petitions on to other authorities, their opinion does not
have any binding force. Meanwhile, the petition authorities do not coordinate with each other. All these factors leave petitioners with the obvious
impression that petition departments are not working seriously. Therefore, it
is not surprising that petitioners regard petition authorities as their
opponents.22
b. Design Defects in the Legal Principle of Petition
Disposition
Second, the legal principle of petition disposition suffers from design
defects. Petition departments usually forward petitions to the related government authorities for disposition after they accept the petition request.
The principle for determining the concrete authority in charge is set forth in
Art. 4 and Art. 21 Para. 3 of the RLV, which outline the principles of “territorial jurisdiction, responsibilities assumed at corresponding level, and the
department in charge being responsible.” These principles mean that petition cases shall be handled by the government where the incident in question transpired or the government of the petitioner’s residence. The
government of the petitioner’s residence shall be responsible for handling
petitions wherein the place of residence and the place of occurrence differ.
The government at the next highest level can also dispose the petition case
if the local government is not competent. However, the government at a
lower level is not allowed to shift the problem directly to the government at
a higher level. This arrangement helps clarify the responsibilities between
the levels of government.
“The department in charge being responsible” means, once the authority in charge of the petition is determined, this authority shall assume the
full responsibility to dispose of the petition and is not allowed to shift the
problem to other government departments. The basic idea here is that the
government with jurisdictional authority shall find the solution independently and preempt petitions from the people, especially overstepping petitions. Nothing is wrong with this idea. To some extent this mechanism can
compel the government departments to deal with petitions carefully and
prevent them from making decisions that could damage the people. However, there are still some significant defects in this mechanism. First, if the
place of occurrence is the same as the place of residence, then the government whose administrative act has caused the petition will be one party of
the dispute but will also play the role of adjudicator. Second, if the place of
occurrence differs from the place of residence, the government in charge of
the petitioner’s residence is responsible for the petition. In either case, such
22. Jiqing (

), supra note 11.
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an arrangement risks a legal but unreasonable resolution of the dispute,
which creates instability in society.
In the first case, the government department acts both as player and
referee, although the government department initiated the dispute. According to this principle, if a town government terminated a lease agreement of
a factory building early but failed to pay compensation in full, this town
government would be finally responsible for dealing with the tenant’s petition, even if the tenant raised his petition at a higher level government department. The result is predictable under such circumstances. Maybe there
are a few government departments that would admit and correct their mistake. However, it is not realistic to have such expectations in most cases.
On the contrary, many officials will think that the petitioner is making
trouble that will smear their reputation and have negative effects on their
careers. Thus, many officials will retaliate. Retaliation is the reason why a
large number of “compulsory mental health treatments” occur in the petition practice.
In the second case, the government department in charge is incapable
of solving the problems of the petitioners at all, because the petition is initiated through the administrative act of another government department. In
addition, such petition cases take place out of the jurisdiction of the government department in charge. In this case, the petitioner is obviously dissatisfied with or antagonistic toward the government department or state organ
whose administrative act has caused the petition. However, if the government in charge is not entitled to review the decision of the government
department of the place of occurrence, or to ask it to make an apology to the
petitioner, how can it prevent the petitioner from raising the petition?
The famous “Tang Hui case” is typical for such a situation.23 At the
beginning of the petition, Tang Hui raised her petition because she was not
satisfied with the judgment of the court. Her youngest daughter was raped
by a group of criminals and only two of them were sentenced to death. Tang
Hui began her petition with the hope of increasing the penalty of the other
criminals. However, she changed her cause of action and raised her petition
against the city government’s commission of “re-education through labor.”
The commission decided to send her through “re-education through labor”
because of her petitions, which was not acceptable to her.24 However, according to “territorial jurisdiction,” the government in the place of Tang
Hui’s residence, Fujiaqiao, was directly responsible for her petition. That
meant that the government of Fujiaqiao had to try to settle Tang Hui’s claim
and stop her petition to higher government. The Fujiaqiao government had
23. Chai Huiqun and Shao Ke (
),
[What Makes Tanghui],
[SOUTHERN WEEKLY ONLINE], Jan. 8, 2013, http://www.infzm.com/content/
93030.
2012 [“Mother of petition” Tang Hui’s 2012], PEOPLE’S DAILY
24.
ONLINE (Apr. 8, 2013, 9:26 PM), http://legal.people.com.cn/GB/43027/353896/index.html.
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no right to require the People’s Court or municipality’s commission of reeducation through labor to change its decision, nor could it hinder her petition. However, the town government officials would have received an administrative punishment if Tang Hui continued her petition at higher levels
of government. Therefore, the only thing they could do was provide various
benefits to Tang Hui and ask her to give up her petition.25 But the acts of
the local government encouraged Tang Hui to continue her petition.
Hence, both methods have disadvantages in solving a petitioner’s
problems. In the first case, the retaliation of local governments will likely
deepen the grudge of the petitioner and his family. The second case might
temporarily satisfy the petitioner by providing some benefits; however, it
will send an improper signal that the government can also be “blackmailed”
and people can get benefits by raising a petition. More and more people are
therefore either directly or indirectly encouraged to realize their interests
through petition. According to a journalistic investigation of Southern
Weekly, at least seven households in the local circle in Yongzhou are willing to imitate Tang Hui’s way of raising petition one after another.26 This is
also a reason why the people in China “trust petition rather than the law”
and “trust trouble making rather than the law.”
In either case, petitioners do not trust their local government because it
cannot adequately solve their problems. That is the major reason why overstepping petition cases increase so rapidly despite the prohibition set forth
in Art. 16 of the RLV.
c. Defects in the Petition Ranking and Responsibility System
Third, the petition ranking and responsibility system has defects. According to Art. 7 of the RLV, the People’s governments at all levels shall:
[E]stablish and improve the responsibility system for letters and
visits . . . investigate the individuals who are responsible for malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed in the work regarding
petition, and circulate a notice of the matter within an appropriate
scope. The people’s governments at all levels shall incorporate
the achievements scored in the work regarding petition into the
performance assessment of public servants.
Petition authorities at all levels, including the national petition office,
will work out a regular “petition ranking” and circulate it internally. This
ranking has become an important criterion of governments at all levels for
assessing the achievement of officials. Besides, governments at all levels
have further established a responsibility system for officials. The chief
leader of CPC committees and governments shall take general responsibility, the leaders directly in charge shall take primary responsibility, and the
25. Huiqun and Ke (
26. Id.

), supra note 23.
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department head dealing with the petition cases shall assume direct responsibility. If the work is done insufficiently, or the responsibility is fulfilled
improperly, or the leaders are not diligent such that large-scale collective
petitions are continuously raised at provincial CPC committees or in Beijing, then the related leader directly in charge shall assume responsibility
and be punished according to the facts of the case.27 Objectively speaking,
this petition ranking and responsibility system can actually give CPC committees and governments at various levels the motive to pay more attention
to the work of petition, and to speed up the resolution of problems. However, the ranking and responsibility system has a number of defects.
First, the ranking system and responsibility system have legal defects.
It is doubtful that they are in accordance with Chinese law. According to
this system, the number of man-hours devoted to petitions, especially in
overstepping petitions, is one of the criteria for examining the performance
and achievement of subordinate officials. The more overstepping petitions
are raised, the poorer the performance of the local officials, and the greater
their potential administrative responsibility and severity of punishment.
This responsibility system is strictly implemented in some places. Any
overstepping petition warrants a punishment. The legitimacy of this ranking
and responsibility system is problematic because presenting petition applications is a legal right granted by the RLV. Although Art. 16 of the RLV
does not encourage overstepping petitions, it is not explicitly forbidden by
the RLV or defined as an illegal act by any other Chinese laws or regulations. Since it is a citizen’s legal right to initiate overstepping petitions,
there is no legal basis to pursue the administrative responsibilities of the
subordinate officials due to the overstepping petition ranking.
Second, the system design contains severe defects that tend to prevent
undertaking appropriate measures to fulfill its purposes. The ranking and
responsibility systems’ ultimate purposes are to control and reduce overstepping petitions. But by merely emphasizing the reduction of petitions,
the system fails to explicitly require the authorities to handle the claims and
wishes of petitioners properly. Therefore, the system design can hardly help
solve the petition problem. Furthermore, the system does not expressly prescribe the measures necessary to realize its purpose.
In a general sense, there are three ways to control and reduce the number of overstepping petitions. The first is to satisfy the petitioner’s claims.
For example, in the case of early termination of a lease agreement, if the
town government could cancel its decision on early termination of the contract or make compensation for the losses suffered, no petition would occur
and the number of petitions would be reduced. The second way is to bribe
the petitioner with temporary benefits and make them dismiss, at least for a
while, the idea of an overstepping petition. The third option is to limit the
27. Jianrong (

), supra note 3, at 26, 27; Mei (

), supra note 4.
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personal freedom of the petitioner, which makes an overstepping petition
impossible.
The first approach is clearly the most effective. It fully resolves the
petition and best complies with the RLV’s original purpose. But it is also
the most complicated and difficult option to implement, mainly because the
petitioner usually has objections to particular decisions made by government officials. In the case of land contracting, the petitioner was angry with
the official who cancelled the contract. The anger could only be eased if the
involved official decided to revoke the prior decision, make appropriate
compensation, and apologize. However, given the complexity of the current
political system, it is hardly imaginable that the involved authority could
make such a decision.
In comparison, the second and third approaches cannot solve the fundamental petition problem and probably conflict with national law. However, they seem to be more simple, practical, and effective. Since the
ranking system only focuses on the control and reduction of petitions and
does not set any restrictions on the measures to be taken, the government
authorities are thus free to select any of the available approaches. It is natural that the simple and practical ways will be preferred. In fact, all levels of
government generally take the second and third approaches in response to
overstepping petitions. Several examples of the latter two approaches include comfort money before holidays, restraint of personal freedom, or illegal interception of petitioners.
Moreover, the joint liability is defective. The ranking and responsibility system is a kind of joint responsibility. Under this system, once an overstepping petition occurs, especially in the case of group petitioners, the
party government officials of several levels could face administrative sanctions, even if some officials do not have anything to do with the petitioner’s
“grievance.” For example, consider a group petition due to demolition compensation. Officials who might be required to take responsibility include,
but are not limited to, the party and chief officer of the neighborhood, the
officer in charge of petition in the neighborhood, the party and government
chief officer of the district that the neighborhood belongs to, the officer in
charge of petition of the district, and the official in charge of house demolition. Among these officials, only the party and government chief officer of
the neighborhood have a direct connection with the demolition project and
are consequently directly responsible for the petition. None of the other
officials have much to do with the issue.
It is doubtful that such joint responsibility is legitimate. Chapter 6 of
the RLV contains eight clauses stipulating the liabilities of related persons
in detail, but almost all of them are based on the fault of the concerned
party. The legal basis for joint liabilities is not in the RLV. In addition, the
rationality of such joint responsibility is questionable. Quite a few officials
who are supposed to assume administrative responsibility do not have any
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direct relation with the petitioner or the petition. They do not have the
power or resources to resolve the petitioner’s claim. In such circumstances,
it is unreasonable to require them to take on administrative responsibility.
Furthermore, such joint responsibility encourages the different levels of
party and government officials responsible for the petitioner’s district to
form a community of common interest. In order to prevent the petitioner
from affecting their political careers, they will band together to stop the
overstepping petition.
2. Consequences of the Micro Design Defects
Based on the analysis above, the petition system mainly contains the
following design defects from the micro perspective:
• Government departments in charge of petitions have responsibility, but possess no power, and thus fail to maintain effective
internal coordination of petitions.
• According to the RLV, the government authority that gives
rise to the petition shall be responsible for its settlement. This
contradicts common principles of dispute resolution and the
principle that “No one should be his own judge.”
• As for the petition ranking and account liability, in addition to
their questionable legitimacy, the system design merely focuses on the reduction of petitions and fails to place sufficient
emphasis on a proper solution to petitioners’ claims.
• Finally, the system imposes joint liability on unrelated officials, which is neither legally justified nor reasonable.
The various strange scenes in petition practice are directly or indirectly
caused by these system defects.
Petition authorities are believed to be irresponsible and only good at
shuffling responsibilities and passing the buck. This is, however, the inevitable outcome of the regulations. The most important function prescribed by
the RLV to the petition authorities is to forward the issue to the related
government authorities. It is no wonder that the petition authority is at its
best when passing the buck. As to whether the authority receiving the petition will handle it promptly and lawfully, the petition authorities do not
have any impact. Therefore, there is no justification to require the official in
charge of the petition authority to assume administrative liability for petitions—especially overstepping petitions.
According to the principles of petition treatment, the government authority, which is triggered by the “grievance” of the petitioner, shall be
responsible for resolving the issue at petition. Such a principle is reasonable
to a certain extent but conflicts with the international common practice of
dispute settlement, according to which an independent third party should be
authorized to mediate and settle a dispute. This defect is the main reason
that petition numbers have remained high in recent years.
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The principle of petition treatment has other negative consequences.
The willingness of some officials to act could be confined by the so-called
principle of “territorial jurisdiction, responsibility assumed at corresponding
level, the department in charge being responsible.” In order to avoid being
the department in charge or the official in charge, and thus being the target
of potential petitions, quite a few officials and departments will find different reasons to avoid their duties or responsibilities. For example, they can
reject the launch of a city reconstruction project that ought to be launched
or refuse to hear a claim in their jurisdiction. The PRC court is a classic
example of an institution adopting such an attitude. Many courts conduct a
so-called “social stability assessment” before deciding to hear a case. If the
assessment concludes that hearing a case and handing down a verdict could
trigger riots and lead to social instability, the court will refuse to hear the
case. In this way, the court will not become the petitioner’s target or the
institution responsible for the petition. Neither rejection by government departments nor the refusal of the courts to intercede will help find a solution
to the problem of the petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner has no other
option than an overstepping petition.
As the system of petition ranking and accountability focuses merely on
the reduction of the number of petitions and fails to stipulate the measures
necessary to realize its purpose, it is no wonder that the petition practice in
China often sees such illegal measures as “petition interception,” “black
jails,” “declared mental disease,” “illegal detention or re-education through
labor,” or even assault and rape.28 Although none of these measures comply
with the RLV, and some of them constitute serious breaches of law, petition
authorities of different levels only adopt these easy and effective measures
for the sake of their political life. And such measures also get the support of
many other officials who are threatened by joint liability.
In addition to the above-mentioned measures, petition authorities also
adopt another temporarily effective method—offering the petitioner a variety of benefits (holiday subsidies, inviting the petitioner and his/her family
to travel, etc.)—to make the petitioner dismiss the idea of an overstepping
petition.
Whichever road is taken, the problem that gave rise to the petition is
not resolved. In fact, these measures only make things worse. By limiting
personal freedom, the authority only fosters more distrust and hatred by the
petitioner. Thus, the concerned party and his family will try every means to
conduct an overstepping petition. By offering benefits, the authority gives
the negative impression that those who cause more waves get more benefits
from the government. This encourages others with far more trivial concerns
to seek a petition. It also explains the existence of the notion that citizens
“trust trouble making rather than the law.”
28. Jianrong (

), supra note 3.
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CURRENT PETITION SYSTEM

Based on the analysis above, the various strange phenomena observed
in the petition system are directly related to its design defects. To remedy
these problems, we should eliminate the defects through reform. More specifically, the petition system should be reformed in a number of areas.
A. Reform of the Petition Authority—Redefining the Function of
Petitions
In order to reduce the number of petitions (including the overstepping
petition) and reverse the trends toward “trusting petition rather than law”
and “trusting trouble making rather than being rational,” the Chinese legislature should redefine the function of the petition. The petition authorities
should be deprived of the function of dispute settlement and interest protection, while their mandate to learn about public life and participate in the
administration and discussion of state affairs should be strengthened. This
fundamental reform should force citizens to pursue their claims solely
through judicial proceedings. Another advantage of this reform scheme is
that it is not necessary to dissolve the petition authority or cut its staff. On
the contrary, in order to transform the petition authority into a qualified
consulting institution participating in the administration and discussion of
state affairs, it should recruit a large number of qualified experts.
B. Reform of the Judicial System
To remove the function of dispute settlement and interest protection
only constitutes part of what is necessary to reform the petition system. Its
success depends on whether China will be able to reestablish the authority
of law, to restore social trust in the judicial system, and to conduct the
necessary supporting reforms in the judicial system. Such reforms include
the following measures.
1. Expansion of Jurisdiction and Strengthening of Administrative
Court
First, the court’s jurisdiction should be expanded and the administrative court should be strengthened. To free the petition system from the function of dispute settlement, the court should hear those cases that might
otherwise be resolved through petition. This is quite practicable. Some
scholars are of the opinion that all petition matters can be distinguished
between legal issues and non-legal issues. Non-legal issues shall include
matters about restructuring of state-owned enterprise, labor and social security of employees, so called “three-dimensional rural problems,”29 compensation for house expropriation and relocation of residents, complaints of
29. I.e., problems with regard to agriculture, rural areas, and peasantry.
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inappropriate conduct and illegal acts of cadres, and problems in primarylevel institution reform as well as environmental pollution.30 Such an opinion implies that non-legal issues cannot be resolved through a judicial approach. However, this has no legal basis. Per the analysis above, all of these
problems are legal problems. The one feature that they all have in common
is that one of the concerned parties is a government authority; this alone
cannot change the fact that they are legal disputes. According to the Administrative Law and Administrative Proceeding Law of China, a government
authority can always be a party in litigation.
If China decides to undergo these reforms, it is foreseeable that the
number of administrative legal actions will increase substantially. Consequently, it will be necessary to enlarge the capacity of the administrative
division of Chinese courts in the short term. From a long-term perspective,
it is advisable to set up independent administrative courts at the proper time.
2. Hearing of Cases on the Basis of Law
Second, the courts should hear cases on the basis of law and should be
freed from the function of keeping social stability. As described above, the
Chinese courts also assume the responsibility of maintaining social stability. This can lead to instances where the court will try every means possible
to reject hearing a case if it concludes that there is a high possibility that its
resolution might trigger social instability. This practice must be eliminated.
First of all, it is doubtful if social stability can really be achieved in this
way. When the interest of a citizen is violated, the judiciary should be the
last resort. If the last resort fails to work, the citizen has nowhere to air his
grievance and no means to protect his interests. He has no option but to go
out and make a petition. We should know from experience that such measures do not achieve social stability but rather tend to increase instability.
Furthermore, social stability should not be used to assess the performance
of courts. In fact, a losing party is usually not satisfied by the verdict and
could take certain radical actions. But this should not be the basis for assessment of the verdict. The only criteria to assess the verdict should be
whether the principle of “all are equal before law” has been followed during
trial and whether the verdict is predicated upon a sufficient legal basis. In
fact, if courts wish to contribute to social stability, the best way for them to
do so is by the fair and just settlement of disputes. This has been amply
demonstrated by the court systems in western countries.
3. Trials According to Law and Unbiased Decisions
Third, the court should be allowed to conduct trials according to law
and render unbiased decisions. It is key to realizing social stability, to re30. Jiqing (

), supra note 11.
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establishing the authority of law, and to restoring citizens’ trust in the rule
of law. It is also key that the courts’ decisions are objective, impartial, and
based on law. For this reason, the Chinese judiciary system needs to be
reformed in multiple ways.
First, administrative interference should be prohibited, and independent jurisdiction should be consolidated. In China, the courts often receive
different kinds of interference from administrative authorities. In many
places courts are to some extent leveraged to protect the interests of local
parties whose cases are being tried.31 Obviously, such interference will affect the justice of any decision and cause serious damage to the court’s
authority. The existence of such interference can be attributed to the courts’
personal and financial dependence on local government.32 Thus, to eliminate administrative interference, it is necessary for the courts to break with
the restrictions of local government. This means reforming the judiciary
system from its current horizontal management structure to a vertical structure. On the other side, if certain government officials attempt to exercise
their influence in judicial proceedings, the officials as well as the judges
should be disciplined accordingly.
Publication is also an effective means to prevent judicial corruption
and ensure unbiased court decisions. Court decisions should be standardized in content and form, and all decisions of all courts should be made
available to the public. In terms of content, a court decision is hardly comprehensive and convincing if it contains the facts, the controversy, and the
arguments of the parties but fails to give a proper analysis and interpretation
of the applicable provisions. Therefore, the courts should add into their decisions the analysis and interpretation of related provisions so as to make
the decisions sufficiently transparent and comprehensible. With respect to
publication, the Chinese Supreme Court now selects and publishes some
cases every year, and most decisions are publicized on the homepage of the
judiciary. But the published decisions only serve as a guide for other courts.
The Supreme Court can hardly play the role of supervisor. It would be
much better if all decisions at all court levels were disclosed. More specifically, court decisions should not only be disclosed on the court website,
they should also be regularly assembled and published by a special editorial
office set up by each province. If this can be achieved, the courts’ trial
quality will increase and unjust trials will be drastically reduced.
Finally, severe sanctions should apply to judges who engage in illegal
trials. Despite all sorts of precautions, judicial corruption is sometimes in31. Zhang Lei (
),
[Establish Risk Assessment Mechanism to Have Double Win in Trial and Maintaining Social Stability], GUANGXI COURT ONLINE
(July 12, 2013, 9:02 AM), http://gxfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=47610.
32. Wang Jianqi (
),
[It’s Not Difficult to Exercise Adjudicative Powers Independently], LEGAL EVENING, July 5, 2013, http://www.qstheory.cn/zl/bkjx/
201307/t20130705_246588.htm.
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evitable. Proof of this unfortunate fact is found in a recently published report on 200 corrupt judges.33 Such judges should be strictly investigated
and prosecuted.
C. Measures for the Transitional Period
Even if China decides to undergo the above-mentioned reforms, many
citizens will continue to bring petitions due to tradition and custom, for
which the government authorities of different levels should be well prepared. The authorities should take the following measures to keep the normal social order. First, a safe area should be designated in front of each
government institution in order to ensure their normal function. Beyond this
safe area, the petitioner should be allowed to sit and express their claims as
long as they comply with the Regulations on Maintaining Social Order, the
PRC Security Punishment Law, and other applicable laws and regulations.
Second, the authorities should deal with the illegal acts of petitioners according to law. If a petitioner conducts illegal acts in the course of a petition, such as insulting, assaulting, blocking public transportation, or
disturbing the working order of government authorities, the police should
take appropriate measures against the involved party.
CONCLUSION
From a broad perspective, both the petition system and the judiciary
are tools the government can use to solve social problems. In terms of the
theory of social systems, the establishment of a new system cannot always
resolve the problems incurred by the malfunctioning of its predecessor.
Rather, the establishment and utilization of a new system will damage the
image of the old system. This has been proven by China’s experience in the
last ten years. The key to solving existing problems is to investigate the
reasons why they arise and then to take targeted measures to reform the
current system. Consequently, problems arising out of the judicial system
should be resolved by confronting the pathologies of the judicial system. If
it is administrative interference or corrupt judges that affect the justice and
authority of law, we should strive to eliminate them. If it is the shortage of
judges that affects the quality and efficiency of trials, then we need to recruit more judges. As long as measures are not targeted, very little will
change. Traditional Chinese medicine admires the principle of “dialectical
and targeted treatment” of diseases; the same applies to the handling of
social problems.

33. Id.

